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Deregulation and Litigation 
by Stephen J. Friedman 
The regulator's attitude toward his professional life is 
well captured by a story about the enormously successful 
and prolific Japanese artist Katsushika Hokusai. As he 
lay dying at the age of 90, after producing over 13,000 
prints and drawings, his daughter heard him murmur 
"Oh, if I could only have just five more years, I could 
become a really great painter." 
So it is with regulators. Engaged in a constant battle 
with a diverse, innovative and aggressive private sector 
that is constantly seeking new ways under, over and 
around the regulatory barriers, the regulator keeps 
tinkering with the regulatory system, believing in his 
heart that in only a few years it will be just right. Some- 
times, in the heat of battle, the original policy objectives 
are lost, and the regulatory system takes on a life of its 
own. At that point, the pendulum begins to swing back 
toward deregulation. Today, we are somewhere on the 
arc of that backswing. 
What does this trend mean for litigation? It will not do 
to say simply that less regulation means less enforcement 
or less litigation; nor, on the other hand, is it necessarily 
the case that a lower level of enforcement means a trans- 
fer of enforcement responsibility to the private bar. 
There are four general problems associated with over- 
regulation. The remedies proposed for each evil contain 
different implications for litigation. Those problem areas 
are: 
the restrictions on competition and market forces 
that flow from economic regulation; 
the cost burdens imposed by the new ventures into 
health and safety regulations of the late 1960s and 
the 1970s; 
the rigidity and drag on innovation introduced by 
excessively detailed rules; and 
the general level of government intrusion into the 
private sector. 
Much of the regulatory apparatus that blossomed dur- 
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ing the first half of this century and the end of the last 
grew from concern about excessive market power as a 
result of a naturally dominant market position. The ICC, 
FCC, CAB and other agencies fall into that category. As 
those agencies evolved, they came to see their roles as 
protecting regulated companies from "excessive compe- 
tition," and regulation became a force for higher prices, 
fueling inflation. 
The Carter administration began to dismantle much of 
that economic regulatory structure. In fact, deregulation 
is probably the most significant accomplishment of that 
administration in the economic area. The CAB is being 
eliminated. There has been substantial deregulation in 
trucking, railroads and communications. In banking, 
deposit interest rate controls are being phased out, 
restricti'ons on functions are being blurred, and barriers 
to interstate banking are crumbling. The Reagan admin- 
istration is pressing forward with this effort, spearheaded 
by its prompt deregulation of oil prices and the struggle 
to resist the rising tide of protectionism. 
Dramatic Example 
Economic deregulation will assuredly mean fewer for- 
mal administrative proceedings. If an agency is no longer 
in the business of allocating routes, approving rates or 
fixing prices, that litigation will drop sharply. There is 
probably no more dramatic example than the fall off in 
litigation following the decontrol of oil prices. Immedi- 
ately before President Reagan took office, there were 
more than 1,500 people administering the price control 
system and its related web of allocation rules. To put that 
total in perspective, throughout most of its life the SEC 
staff has ranged in size between 1,500 and 2,000. 
The reduction in administrative proceedings and re- 
lated enforcement work will not be supplanted by private 
sector litigation, since in large measure the substantive 
rules themselves will disappear. However, antitrust lit- 
igation will probably increase as the antitrust immunity 
conferred by regulatory approval of pricing behavior or 
mergers begins to fall away. 
The second complaint about overregulation is the 
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asserted excessive cost burdens it imposes on the produc- 
tive process. In general, this contention is aimed not at 
the financial regulatory agencies such as the SEC and the 
bank regulators, or the economic regulators of market 
power, but rather against the agencies administering 
health and safety rules. 
Governments have imposed "unproductive" costs in 
the form of fire and building codes for a long time. But 
concern for air and water quality and highway safety, 
and a keener appreciation of the impact of chemical con- 
tamination, have escalated these costs. 
A double-barreled remedy has been proposed to deal 
with these mounting costs: greater executive control 
through the Office of Management and Budget, and a 
requirement that the agency consider economic burdens 
when it adopts new regulations. Although the Supreme 
Court recently decided that the Department of Labor was 
not required to weigh the costs of OSHA's cotton dust 
standard against the benefits, American Textile Mfis. 
Inst. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981), Congress may 
well require that balancing both for OSHA and for other 
agencies. 
Weighing costs and benefits is easier said than done, 
since it is often difficult to convert health and safety ben- 
efits into monetary terms. That difficulty will produce 
more litigation instituted by unions and public interest 
groups, just as has been true with environmental impact 
statements. Indeed, some current legislation requires 
analyses much like "inflation impact statements." See, 
e.g., Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. $5 601-612. 
The attempt to quantify the impact of regulation has 
not produced very satisfactory results in agencies such 
as the SEC. For example, the Regulatory Flexibility Act 
requires the agencies to consider alternatives if a pro- 
posed rule will have a "significant economic impact" on 
a "substantial number of small entities." 5 U.S.C. 
§ 605. In a mature regulatory system like that adminis- 
tered by the SEC, most rulemaking is incremental, in- 
volving only adjustments to the existing requirements. 
Since the statute does not require a reappraisal of the set 
of rules being amended, the statutory threshold is seldom 
met. 
The proposed requirement that OMB approve new 
rules could compromise the status of independent agen- 
cies. Agencies would be required to negotiate new rules 
with the OMB staff, just as a one-house legislative veto 
requires negotiating with the congressional staff. That 
approach is outside of the public record; it cannot be 
tested through judicial review and it substitutes executive 
branch decisionmaking for that of the agency. This en- 
croachment on independent statutory responsibilities 
will be the grist for new litigation by labor unions and 
public interest groups. 
The third major element of deregulation is the effort to 
control excessively detailed and rigid rules. These rules 
reflect a loss of balance and perspective-a regulatory 
myopia. 
Any regulatory system rests upon a set of values-in 
the case of the SEC, for example, the worth of disclosure 
of material facts to the marketplace. The agency's rules 
simply implement those values. When a regulatory sys- 
tem is young, the eyes of those who deal with it are firmly 
fixed on the values. As it matures, perfection of the reg- 
ulatory net becomes an independent goal, and the rules 
sometimes become divorced from the ultimate values 
that gave rise to them. 
The success of the regulatory system and the aggres- 
siveness, intelligence and innovation of the regulators 
often generate excessive regulation. Regulators are en- 
gaged in a constant battle with the efforts of thousands 
of market participants to gain a competitive edge by 
bypassing some of the rules. The smarter and more expe- 
rienced the regulator, the more escape routes he will 
identify and try to deal with through prophylactic and 
sometimes overly rigid rules. 
At that point, the agency needs a fresh outlook-a 
return to basic assumptions and the means to achieve 
them. It requires self-restraint by the regulators or a 
restraining hand by an outside agency, such as OMB. It 
may be necessary to rely on broad statutory or regulatory 
commands rather than detailed recipes for behavior. 
Self-Regulation 
It is unclear whether this element of deregulation will 
produce less litigation. Broad prohibitions can provide as 
much opportunity for enforcement as detailed rules. In- 
deed, the SEC Enforcement Division tends to operate 
most vigorously in the interstices between the detailed 
rules, acting instead on the basis of standards such as the 
antifraud rules or the fiduciary provisions of the Invest- 
ment Company Act. This is so because self-regulation 
works most effectively when there are detailed rules, and 
there is thus less need for enforcement action. Moreover, 
general prohibitions like the antifraud rules provide reg- 
ulators with the tools to react to efforts to circumvent 
their rules. 
Consider the following tradeoffs between regulations 
and enforcement in the area of securities regulation. 
Before the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was adopted, 
the Commission found an adequate legal and practical 
basis in its disclosure systems to proscribe the bribery of 
foreign officials. The accounting provisions of the Act 
now require that issuers maintain an appropriate system 
of internal accounting controls and accurate books and 
records. But the enforcement litigation under the Act has 
been limited in virtually every case to an egregious depar- 
ture from accepted norms of financial accounting prac- 
tices, and the charges include general allegations of an- 
tifraud violations as well as violations of the accounting 
provision of the Act. 
Even without the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the 
level of SEC enforcement proceedings dealing with con- 
duct now covered by both the antibribery and accounting 
provisions would not be significantly lower. In short, 
restraint in rulemaking may not mean less enforcement 
activity by those agencies, like the SEC, that have gen- 
eral mandates under which they can proceed. Moreover, 
the antifraud rules provide a basis for private suits. 
Another example of these tradeoffs is provided by the 
amendments to section 17 of the Investment Company 
Act that were adopted last year in the Small Business In- 
(Please turn to page 50) 
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$1 million. One recent verdict 
amounted to $2.9 million. These 
results have had a strong impact, of 
course, upon subsequent settlement 
offers in other cases. 
Districts vary dramatically in the 
percentage of cases that have been 
disposed of. Many cases have been 
tried in Colorado and the Eastern 
District of Virginia. On the other 
hand, as of summer 1981, none had 
been tried in the Southern District of 
New York. Routine calendar delays 
and the appointment of a single judge 
are a major factor in determining how 
quickly the cases are resolved. 
The American legal system has 
proven in recent years that it can 
handle in an orderly fashion mass 
litigation concerning catastrophies. 
The swine flu litigation is another ex- 
ample of this orderly process. The 
swine flu litigation can be criticized, 
however. for the delavs in some 
jurisdictions and the expense-both 
for the government and individual 
plaintiffs. Moreover, the government 
has become an adversarv of the 
citizens it originally acted to protect. 
No matter who wins the remaining 
cases, the wisdom of Congress's deci- 
sion to permit the government to step 
into the private world of the manufac- 
turers and defend the swine flu suits is 
certain to be a hotly debated issue the 
next time scientists warn of an im- 
pending, nationwide health hazard. 
Deregulation 
& Litigation 
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vestment Incentive Act, 15 U.S.C. §$ 
80a-53-80a-64. Section 17 contains a 
broad prohibition against trans- 
actions involving an investment com- 
pany and its affiliates. As a practical 
matter, many such transactions are a 
necessary part of business life for in- 
vestment companies carrying on ven- 
ture capital-like activities. The SEC 
has power to grant exemptions. In 
practice, the Commission gave an 
exemption only after a long and de- 
tailed negotiation with the investment 
company about an "appropriate" set 
of conditions to the exemption. 
The Small Business Investment In- 
centive Act was designed to ease the 
regulatory burden on publicly held 
venture capital companies. Many 
transactions involving business devel- 
opment companies and affiliates are 
no longer prohibited so long as the 
board of directors of the company, in- 
cluding its independent directors, 
concludes that the transaction is 
"reasonable and fair" and does "not 
involve overreaching of [the business 
development] company or its share- 
holders or partners on the part of any 
person concerned." 15 U.S.C. 8 
80a-56(f)(l). The shift away from a 
detailed administrative proceeding 
was clearly intended to "get the 
government off the backs of invest- 
ment companies." At the same time, 
the breadth of those standards and 
their ambiguity will result in addi- 
tional litigation on the part of both the 
SEC and private litigants. 
Less Government 
Finally, there is an element of 
deregulation that comes down to. 
nothing more than less government. 
It recognizes that some aspects of 
human economic behavior are so am- 
biguous or multi-purpose that gov- 
ernment cannot reach the concededly 
questionable conduct without unduly 
restricting legitimate activity. It ac- 
cepts the fact that we must tolerate 
some abuse to avoid the evils of over- 
regulation. 
Some believe that this will mean 
reduced enforcement activities. Some 
have suggested that this step will 
simply shift the locus of the litigation 
from the agency to private litigation. 
But, in some regulatory regimes, pri- 
vate rights of action do not exist. If 
the agency does not act, there is no 
action. 
The securities law antifraud rules 
generally authorize private litigation. 
But SEC enforcement proceedings 
under the antifraud rules have not 
replaced private litigation. The two 
have often proceeded side-by-side. 
Many Commission enforcement pro- 
ceedings grow out of its unique access 
to information-its inspection pro- 
gram and customer complaint collec- 
tion system. The lack of a Commis- 
sion follow-up investigation and the 
attendant publicity may well mean a 
lower level of class actions and 
derivative actions. 
Federal regulators may draw fewer 
regulations over the next several 
years. And the ones they draw may 
contain broader strokes. Some of 
these changes will undoubtedly re- 
duce the opportunities for litigation, 
but it is uncertain whether the net im- 
pact of deregulation will be less litiga- 
tion. 
From 
the Bench 
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ily depend in some measure on wheth- 
er you represent a plaintiff or a defen- 
dant. If you represent a defendant the 
background of the case will already 
have been covered by the plaintiff and 
by the opening statements, though 
you may want at the outset to supply 
any vital omissions in the background 
or to correct and refute by your first 
witness any false or incorrect state- 
ments about the background sug- 
gested by the witnesses of the plain- 
tiff. If the discrepancies about the 
background are great, you may wish 
to start over and have your witness 
paint an entirely new or different 
background more in keeping with 
your theories of the case. 
If you represent a plaintiff you start 
the presentation of evidence laboring 
under one distinct disadvantage: you 
have to go first. Remember the old 
saw that "figures don't lie but liars 
do figure." While you are questioning 
your client on direct, your opponent 
and his lawyer are sitting there listen- 
ing to everything he says and busily 
adjusting their tactics and position 
to capitalize on every advantage re- 
vealed. In many situations it is a dis- 
tinct advantage for your opponent to 
have to take a position first. Fre- 
quently there is nothing you can do 
about this and in some cases it makes 
little difference, but there are also 
many cases in which you should con- 
sider completely reversing this ad- 
vantage by calling the opposite party 
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